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ABSTRACT
Large and persistent diﬀerences in corruption across comparable coun-
tries often are loosely attributed to unarticulated “cultural factors.” Such
attributions may indicate a lack of firmer perspectives from social sci-
ences. An even more challenging research issue is the presence of such
diﬀerences across regions within the same country, because, in compari-
son to diﬀerent countries, such regions generally share more socioeconomic
and governance characteristics.
A principal theme of this paper is that an individual’s perceptions of
his or her environment are influenced by the realities that this individual
and others have faced in the past, and that these perceptions aﬀect cur-
rent and future actions of individuals, which in turn exert influences on
the current and future realities. A dynamic analysis of this theme yields
a number of observations concerning individuals’ behavior and societal
outcomes.
*This is a revised version of “Persistence and Pervasiveness of Corruption: New Per-
spectives,” Discussion Paper No. 560, Economic Growth Center, Yale University, 1988.
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Peter Kriz, Roberto Mariano, Ashoka Mody, Irina Ostrovnaya, Anne Thomas and Ji-
tendra Singh for their help with this version. Contact information: 1155 E. 60th St.,
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I. INTRODUCTION
The phenomenon of corruption has perhaps existed since the earliest organized
societies, almost regardless of the structure of the societal organization; see, for ex-
ample, Darling (1996, Chapter VIII), Miller (1992), Lovell et al. (2000), Lui (1979),
and Waquet (1992). Those with an understanding of multiple societies have often
noted that there are large diﬀerences in the levels of corruption across diﬀerent so-
cieties. Such diﬀerences between many developing and more modern economies are
particularly salient. In many developing societies, almost every kind of transaction
between a citizen and the government usually entails at least some degree of corrup-
tion and illegality. Since the 1990s, various indices of corruption across countries have
become available; for example, those published by Transparency International (vari-
ous years). With their many limitations, some of which are noted below, such indices
also indicate large diﬀerences in the levels of corruption across countries. A positive
analysis of such diﬀerences, across countries and across regions within a country, is a
primary motivation of this paper.
A history of not understanding such diﬀerences has perhaps had deleterious ef-
fects on economic theory and policymaking concerning developing economies. The
phenomenon of corruption was almost altogether missing from the formal discourses
in development economics until the late 1980s. A concrete example is the Handbook
of Development Economics (1988 and 1989) which contains reviews of the conceptual
frameworks of that era. Such intellectual blind spots seem primarily to reflect fads
and fashions of research paradigms, rather than political or methodological biases of
researchers. Widespread corruption is an issue, in diﬀerent ways, for a conservative
or a liberal, a traditional price theorist or a behavioral economist, and so on. Since
hard data on corruption is generally unavailable (more on this later), such fads and
fashions may also be influenced by the researcher’s own exposures and experiences. A
researcher in Chicago is likely to be aware of the rich lore of corruption in the city of
Chicago. Likewise, a policymaker in Washington DC is likely to be aware of the long
history of corruption in Washington DC. Such individuals may have some inadvertent
predisposition to view the levels of corruption in the rest of the world through the
lenses of their own experiences, without adequately recognizing that, during the same
time period, corruption in many other parts of the world has been at altogether diﬀer-
ent levels of magnitude and pervasiveness. Similar intellectual blind spots regarding
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corruption have also existed in numerous developing countries, as well as in interna-
tional organizations, in the policies and projects that they supported, financially or
otherwise. Some openness in the discussion of these issues has been seen since the
1990s, though it is unclear whether there is any substantive change. An open ques-
tion for future research, which is not a concern of this paper, is the extent to which
the problems that developing countries have accumulated in the post-colonial period
are attributable to the intellectual blind spots of the kind noted in this paragraph.
An understanding of the large and persistence diﬀerences in corruption across
countries is a challenging research issue, and an even more challenging issue is the
understanding of such diﬀerences across diﬀerent regions or sub-economies within
the same country. This is because: (i) the level of corruption is generally believed to
reflect in part the nature of governance structures, the laws and their enforcements,
and so on; and (ii) diﬀerent countries are usually, but not in every case, more dif-
ferent concerning the aspects just noted than diﬀerent regions within a country. An
example of sustained intra-country diﬀerences in Europe is that between northern
and southern Italy. An example in India is that between the neighboring provinces
of Bihar and West Bengal. At least since the mid-1600s, these two provinces, with
changing geographical configurations, have been under nearly the same systems of
federal governance or non-governance. There are many examples of intra-country
diﬀerences in other parts of the world.
To say that one country has more corruption than another entails issues of mea-
surement (throughout the paper, the phrases “country” or “economy” can be in-
terpreted, depending on the context, as “region” and “sub-economy” respectively).
The nature of corruption is such that direct data on corruption will perhaps never
be available with a high degree of hardness and abundance, comparable to, say,
electronically-captured data on individuals’ purchases in modern supermarkets. It
is therefore likely that subjectivities, including those inherent in the indices of cor-
ruption mentioned earlier, will perhaps continue to play a role in the assessment of
inter-country or intra-country diﬀerences in corruption.1 The present paper acknowl-
edges this subjectivity.
As conceptual overviews of corruption have rightly pointed out, there are diﬀerent
categories of corruption, even though there are typically considerable overlaps among
them; see Aidt (2003), Andvig (1991), Bardhan (1997), Rose-Ackerman (1999) and
Jain (2001). One category of corruption is organized, in relatively centralized ways,
1There have been noteworthy recent innovations in inferring misconduct from indirect but avail-
able data; see Duggan and Levitt (2002) and Jacob and Levitt (2003).
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by combinations of such elements as an autocratic ruler, his (her) family and cronies,
and one or more groups of oligarchs. Such corruption typically targets the de facto
control of financial institutions, natural resources, and other specific sectors of the
economy. Suharto’s Indonesia is an example of this category of corruption. A diﬀerent
category of corruption, which can coexist with the previous one, is that of “diﬀused”
and demographically-widespread corruption undertaken by a large proportion of bu-
reaucrats, including those at the lowest levels, in their day-to-day transactions with
citizens. Among numerous examples of such transactions are: (i) assessment and pay-
ment of various kinds of taxes and government fees; (ii) trying to receive everyday
public services; (iii) protecting one’s property rights, such as preventing an unautho-
rized occupation of one’s property or getting a delinquent tenant evicted from one’s
property; (iv) a transaction between a food adulterer and an oﬃcial who is responsible
for food safety; or even something as ordinary as (v) getting a vehicle registered or a
passport issued. Corruption of this kind is not centrally organized or coordinated in
any significant manner by anyone, including the politicians, even though they usually
share its proceeds. Such corruption is a defining aspect of the routine of life in South
Asia, where it coexists with the manifestations of oligarchic corruption mentioned
earlier. This diﬀused and demographically-widespread category is the focus of this
paper.2
A principal theme of this paper is that an individual’s perceptions of his environ-
ment are influenced by the realities of the past. These influences arise from a large
number of sources: personal experiences, experiences of others in the individual’s
personal environment, media, education, and so on. These perceptions influence in-
dividuals’ current actions, which in turn influence the realities that will exist in the
present and future. At each stage in this process, human perceptions and actions
are aﬀected by a variety of factors including biases, imperfections of information and
inference, and chance. Since this process is intrinsically dynamic, I construct an ex-
plicitly dynamic model. In addition to realism, this model has several advantages,
including that many of its predictions concerning individual and group behavior could
not have been obtained without a dynamic analysis.
The formal models presented in this paper translate the above theme in partic-
ular ways, while recognizing that there might be other ways to do the same. For
2An aspect of such corruption is that it involves a large part of the population, and this in-
volvement is ongoing rather than episodic. Its welfare costs, inclusive of deadweight burdens, could
therefore be larger than those of oligarchic corruption. Such important questions of welfare analysis
are not pursued in this paper.
3
concreteness, the formal analysis in this paper uses a particular set of simplifying
assumptions. I present comments on how these assumptions can be modified without
altering the main theme of the analysis.
The key components of the formal analysis are as follows. Within the setting of
overlapping generations, a new cohort of citizens becomes active in the economy in
each time period. This cohort has diverse initial perceptions concerning the “level
of corruption” (that is, the fraction of bureaucrats who are corrupt), and the cohort
remains active for a finite number of periods. Likewise, a new cohort of bureaucrats,
with diverse initial perceptions concerning the level of cheating by citizens, enters the
economy in each period. Here, “cheating” is a shorthand for a citizen’s activities that
are ex ante more beneficial to him if he were to ex post encounter a bureaucrat who is
corrupt rather than one who is not. The “level of cheating” is the fraction of citizens
who cheat. The diversity of initial beliefs can arise from a variety of sources, including
intrinsic characteristics of individuals, as well as familial and social influences during
childhood.
As he progress through his life, each individual revises his perceptions. These
revisions are based on his own past experiences, as well as on all other information,
often partly erroneous, that he has gathered intentionally or otherwise. As will be
seen later, any mild form of learning-from-experience, including but not limited to
Bayesian updating, is suﬃcient for our analysis. Based on his current perceptions
and on other considerations, including preferences and pecuniary trade-oﬀs, a citizen
chooses, in each period, whether or not to cheat, and a bureaucrat chooses whether
or not to be corrupt.
The choices just described, in turn, influence the future perceptions of individuals,
which influence their future choices. Through these dynamic relationships, future lev-
els of cheating and corruption in the economy become explicitly linked to past levels
of cheating and corruption, as well as to the fundamentals of the economy (that is, the
parameters describing the economy). I use this framework to examine some qualita-
tive properties of: (a) individuals’ choices; (b) the economy-wide dynamic evolution
of cheating and corruption; and (c) the eﬀects of some of the economy’s parameters
on the levels of cheating and corruption. Some of the conclusions, discussed in detail
later, are as follows.
(i) Similar individuals will in general diﬀer in their perceptions and choices. Con-
sequently, the perceptions of many individuals can be noticeably diﬀerent from
the reality. For example, two citizens may have quite diﬀerent perceptions (one
believing that corruption is extensive, while the other assessing it as negligible),
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even though they belong to the same cohort, face the same economic trade-oﬀs,
and have started their active lives with identical initial perceptions. Bardhan
(1997, pp. 1333—34) summarizes some of the evidence from developing countries
which supports this conclusion. For instance, Neher (1977, p. 485) finds diver-
sity in citizens’ beliefs concerning the extent of corruption in a Thai province.
Oldenberg (1987) studies similar matters at the grass-root level in Northern
India.3
(ii) A greater prevalence of cheating or corruption in the past induces a greater
prevalence of cheating and corruption in the future. Two economies whose cur-
rent economic fundamentals are comparable can have diﬀerent levels of cheating
and corruption. These conclusions are consistent with the large inter-country
and intra-country diﬀerences in corruption discussed earlier.
(iii) There are many instances in which societal and political leaders have undertaken
campaigns, often highly publicized but short-lived, to eliminate corruption.
Such eﬀorts are unlikely to alter the long-term levels of cheating and corruption
in the economy. This is because the eﬀects of the past can be long lasting
and can easily overwhelm the eﬀects of transitory and incremental campaigns.
However, sustained changes in policies and institutions can have lasting eﬀects
which become magnified with time.
(iv) Roughly speaking, older cohorts of bureaucrats are likely to exhibit higher or
lower levels of corruption than younger cohorts, depending on whether the
economy-wide incidence of cheating is high or low. An analogous relationship
holds for older versus younger cohorts of citizens.
(v) Some bureaucrats are not corrupt even in economies that are viewed as ex-
treme examples of corruption. Conversely, some bureaucrats are corrupt even
in economies that are viewed as extreme examples of the absence of corruption.
The present analysis predicts this pattern. In other words, under plausible as-
sumptions, it is not possible that an economy will be totally corrupt or totally
free from corruption. Likewise, it is not possible that all citizens in an econ-
omy will cheat or that no citizen will cheat. These conclusions suggest that
the present analysis is more realistic than those that predict that either all or
3An example from a diﬀerent context is the Gallup Poll on how citizens rate the honesty and ethical
standards of local political oﬃceholders in the United States; see Gallup (1977—86). This multi-year
survey shows a large variance in the cross-section of responses. This variance is substantial even
among respondents who are homogeneous with respect to characteristics such as income, occupation,
race, and gender; see Gallup (1972—76, Vol. 2, pp. 823—50).
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none of the bureaucrats will be corrupt; for example, see Andvig (1991, p. 71).
It is separately noteworthy that these conclusions do not rely on diﬀerences in
individuals’ preferences or pecuniary trade-oﬀs.
I now highlight some key points of departure of the present paper in relation to
the literature. Much of the existing economic analysis of corruption is based, directly
or indirectly, on frameworks arising from Becker (1968). Depending on the context,
this framework can be enriched by such constructs as agency theory (Aidt (2003)),
industrial organization (Shleifer and Vishny (1993)), incomplete contracts, and so
on. Much has been learned from such approaches and will continue to be learnt
in the future. The present analysis is entirely consistent with Becker-style choices
of individuals. The focus of this analysis is on endogenous human perceptions and
their consequences. Such perceptions (including, for example, those concerning the
probability that a corrupt bureaucrat will be detected and punished) are typically ex-
ogenous parameters in the literature noted above. This contrast is roughly analogous
to general equilibrium analyses of endogenous prices versus analyses of microeconomic
choices taking prices as exogenously specified parameters.
Another departure from the literature is as follows. Multiple equilibria have long
been present in economics literature; for example, in Walrasian models, in tipping
models, and in variations of these and other models. Among the early tipping mod-
els of corruption are those by Cadot (1987), Andvig and Moene (1990) and And-
vig (1991). In these models, there is no link between individuals’ choices and the
emergence of one versus another equilibrium. More generally, these models do not
attempt to understand why one particular equilibrium arises in one situation and
yet a diﬀerent one in a comparable situation. Also, these models do not shed light
on the processes through which one or more of the multiple equilibria change over
time. In the present analysis, there are no agents or forces within the economy which
deliberately or otherwise can bring about an equilibrium. Instead, the only basic
characterization is that of an economy evolving over time, including due to endoge-
nous forces resulting from individuals’ actions, and there are no outside assumptions
concerning the nature of this evolution. As a part of the analysis of this evolution,
I examine its steady-states, which are derived explicitly from the dynamics of the
economy.
To keep the paper tractable and within a reasonable length, as well as to maintain
its focus, I have adopted several boundaries on the analysis, including the following.
(i) The present analysis is a positive one. I take as given the economy’s legal and
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administrative rules and structures, which are represented through exogenous para-
meters. I trace the eﬀects of changes in some of these parameters (or, alternatively,
the consequences of diﬀerences in these parameters between two economies) on in-
dividual and social behavior. The paper does not deal with such normative issues
as how to set up governments’ structures concerning compensation, monitoring, in-
vestigations, and punishments; see Mookherjee and Png (1995), Prendergast (2000),
and the references therein. (ii) I do not examine the relationship between corrup-
tion and aspects such as growth (Ehrlich and Lui (1999) and Mauro (1995)) and
eﬃciency and welfare (Aidt (2003)). (iii) Recall the earlier discussion of diﬀused and
demographically-widespread corruption, which is the focus of this paper, versus oli-
garchic corruption. An aspect of the former category is that citizens and bureaucrats
typically participate in it as faceless entities because, for example, there are many
of them, and the turnover of bureaucrats, including their transfers to diﬀerent loca-
tions, is significant. A natural assumption to make then is that, in this category of
corruption, strategic considerations are not perhaps as central in the interactions be-
tween individuals as they are, say, in the interactions among the primary participants
in oligarchic corruption. Accordingly, the analysis presented in this paper abstracts
from strategic considerations. I depict atomistic interactions among a large number
of individuals, in a manner similar to price-taking behavior of atomistic consumers
and firms. (iv) The dynamic relationships of the kind described here, including the
formation and consequences of perceptions, play a role in understanding many other
societal phenomena besides corruption. A full discussion of these is outside the scope
of this paper; see Sah (1991a) for an analysis of crime, and Lazear (2000) for some
methodological observations.
There are several important literatures which provide perspectives which are com-
plementary to but diﬀerent from those presented in this paper. Since a full discussion
of these literatures will take us far afield, I present some brief remarks: (i) In the lit-
erature on herding and informational cascades, individuals take actions sequentially.
An individual’s action is based on his information and on the history of actions taken
by the individuals preceding him. An elegant example in Avery and Zemsky (1998,
p. 725) describes the basic mechanism; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1998)
provide a overview. In this literature, the same history of actions by previous individ-
uals is available to all subsequent individuals. For example, consider two individuals,
respectively the fourth and the fifth to choose actions. Both observe the same history
of actions by the first three individuals. In contrast, in the present paper, individuals
do not observe any common history. As outlined earlier, and discussed in detail later,
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each individual has his own separate set of observations, based on his own experiences
and other knowledge which he can gather. This representation is arguably better for
studying cheating and corruption of the kind which is the focus of this paper. (ii)
This paper’s abstract depiction of the nature of interactions between citizens and
bureaucrats appears to me to be natural, in the sense of being of first-order impor-
tance, for studying routine transactions between individuals belonging to these two
groups. There are many other ways in which social influences are created and felt by
individuals, and the relative importance of these ways depends partly on the context
at hand. Glaeser and Scheinkman (2000) present a rich taxonomy of such influences,
with many resulting insights. (iii) A branch of this taxonomy consists of models
of interactions adapted from statistical physics; Durlauf and Blume (2001) provide
a summary of such models and their potential applications. (iv) Tirole (1996) and
Zucker (1977) have studied alternative mechanisms of intertemporal persistence.
Organization of the paper. Section II presents a simplified version of individ-
uals’ choices and analyzes some of their properties. Section III derives and analyzes
dynamic relationships between past and future levels of cheating and corruption. Sec-
tion IV analyzes the eﬀects of some of the parameters of the economy on cheating and
corruption. For simplicity, the preceding analysis assumes that citizens begin their
active lives with homogeneous initial beliefs, and that the same holds for bureaucrats.
This assumption is removed in Section V. Section VI presents some extensions of the
preceding analysis. Section VII concludes with some speculative remarks.
II. INDIVIDUALS’ CHOICES
This section provides building blocks for the rest of the paper. It describes the
choices of a citizen and a bureaucrat, and presents some properties of these choices.
The simplifying assumptions made in this section are relaxed or discussed in later
parts of the paper.
In each time period, a new cohort of bureaucrats and citizens become active in
the economy. Each cohort consists of a large number of bureaucrats, and an even
larger number of citizens. An individual is active for L periods. Depending on the
context, a “period” can be defined arbitrarily, such as a week, month or a year. The
value of L is large but finite because human life is finite. Citizens begin their active
lives with identical initial beliefs concerning the level of corruption in the economy.
Likewise, bureaucrats begin their active lives with identical initial beliefs concerning
the level of cheating in the economy. Individuals revise their beliefs as they progress
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through life, which, as will be seen, makes their subsequent beliefs heterogeneous.
Diversity of initial beliefs is incorporated later in the paper.
In each period, a citizen encounters one bureaucrat, and a bureaucrat encounters
M citizens, where M > 1; alternative assumptions in this regard as well as the role
of other sources of information that might aﬀect an individual’s beliefs are discussed
later. In each period, a citizen’s choice is to cheat or not to cheat. Likewise, a
bureaucrat’s choice is to be corrupt or not to be corrupt. The participants in dif-
ferent encounters are determined stochastically. There is an equal probability that
a particular citizen will encounter any one of the bureaucrats during a given period.
Similarly, there is an equal probability that any citizen will belong to the subset of
citizens whom a particular bureaucrat encounters during a given period. Thus, nei-
ther a bureaucrat nor a citizen knows in advance who will constitute his counterparty
in a particular period. An individual must make his choice before the encounter. The
individual’s choice is therefore determined by the individual’s current beliefs and his
gains and losses from the alternative choices.
A citizen’s choices. For a citizen who chooses to cheat in a particular period,
the (expected) utility is u00 if he encounters a corrupt bureaucrat, and the utility is
u01 if he encounters a bureaucrat who is not corrupt. The corresponding utilities for
a citizen who chooses not to cheat are u10 and u11. The only assumptions concerning
the payoﬀs are that u00 > u10, and u11 > u01. The first inequality says that having
cheated is better for a citizen than not having cheated if he encounters a corrupt
bureaucrat. The second inequality says that not having cheated is better for a cit-
izen than having cheated if he encounters a non-corrupt bureaucrat. Both of these
assumptions are reasonable.4
The above structure of payoﬀs accommodates a variety of possible configurations.
4The above description of payoﬀs is quite general concerning aspects such as individuals’ risk
aversion, benefits from cheating, bribes to the bureaucrats, and fines and punishments from the
detection of cheating. As an illustration, consider the configuration in which a non-cheating citizen
is treated identically by a corrupt and a non-corrupt bureaucrat. Define the following: I is the non-
cheating citizen’s full income including the benefits received from the interaction with a bureaucrat,
p is the probability that the cheating will be detected, Zbenefit is the extra benefit from cheating,
Zfine is the net fine that a cheating citizen pays if a non-corrupt bureaucrat detects the cheating,
Zbribe is the net bribe that a cheating citizen pays if a corrupt bureaucrat detects the cheating, and
v is the citizen’s utility function. Then, u00 ≡ pv(I +Zbenefit−Zbribe)+ (1− p)v(I +Zbenefit), u01
≡ pv(I + Zbenefit − Zfine) + (1 − p)v(I + Zbenefit), and u10 = u11 ≡ v(I). As mentioned earlier,
this paper does not deal with eﬃciency aspects of corruption. As a part of this boundary, I do not
compare the eﬃciency of alternative forms of the full compensation of bureaucrats in the presence
or absence of corruption.
9
One such configuration is that a citizen who does not cheat has the same payoﬀ
whether he encounters a corrupt or a non-corrupt bureaucrat. That is, u10 = u11.
This configuration is consistent with my assumptions on the payoﬀs stated in the
previous paragraph. Another configuration is that a citizen who has chosen not to
cheat is worse-oﬀ if he encounters a corrupt rather than a non-corrupt bureaucrat.
That is, u11 > u10. This configuration is also consistent with my assumptions on
the payoﬀs. Separately, this configuration illustrates that my definition of cheating is
based solely on the ex ante choice of a citizen. For instance, in this configuration, the
citizen chooses ex ante not to cheat (and undertakes associated actions; for exam-
ple, filing honest tax returns), and, ex post, the corrupt bureaucrat forces an illegal
transfer of resources from this citizen to himself. In my nomenclature, this transfer
represents, depending on the context, such phenomena as extortion and predation,
but not cheating. Finally note that I do not make any assumptions concerning the
relative magnitudes of u00 and u11; that is, whether having cheated and encoun-
tered a corrupt bureaucrat is better or worse for a citizen than not having cheated
and encountered a non-corrupt bureaucrat. These relative magnitudes will depend
partly on the surplus from cheating and corruption, and how this surplus is divided
between the citizen, the bureaucrat, and the deadweight loss. Accordingly, these
relative magnitudes will vary across diﬀerent situations of corruption. The present
paper abstracts from the causes and consequences of this variation.
The choice made by a citizen in each period depends on his mean estimate of
the level of corruption in the economy. This is because this estimate represents the
citizen’s assessment of the probability of encountering a corrupt bureaucrat. Now,
consider a citizen at the beginning of period T , who began his active life in period
t. Let a denote the vector of his characteristics. As will be seen, depending on the
issues at hand, particular economic meanings can be attached to the elements of a.
Let s(t, T ) denote the number of corrupt bureaucrats that this citizen has encountered
during periods t to T − 1. Let q(s(t, T ), a) define his mean estimate of the level of
corruption at the beginning of period T . Then, this citizen’s choice in period T will
be:5
Cheat if and only if: q(s(t, T ), a) ≥ u, (1)
5To derive (1), note that the utility from cheating is qu00 + (1 − q)u01 and the utility from not
cheating is qu10 + (1 − q)u11. This yields (1). It is assumed that an individual chooses to cheat if
he is indiﬀerent between cheating and not cheating. The analysis remains unchanged if the opposite
assumption is made.
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where u ≡ (u11 − u01)/{(u00 − u10) + (u11 − u01)} . The summary parameter u can
be viewed as the “relative cost of cheating” because it is increasing in u11 and u10,
and decreasing in u01 and u00. Our assumptions concerning the payoﬀs imply that
1 > u > 0.
A bureaucrat’s choices. If a bureaucrat is corrupt during a particular period,
then his utility is linearly increasing in the number of citizens, denoted bym, who have
chosen to cheat among those whom this bureaucrat encounters during this period.
The idea here is that a corrupt bureaucrat’s “catch” is larger if he ends up dealing
with a larger number of cheating citizens. The utility of a corrupt bureaucrat is
thus described by U0(m) ≡ U01 + mU00, where U00 is positive, and M ≥ m ≥ 0.
The utility of a bureaucrat who is not corrupt is denoted by U1. I assume that
U0(M) > U1 > U0(0). That is, the utility of a bureaucrat who is not corrupt lies
between a corrupt bureaucrat’s maximum possible utility, which arises when all of
the citizens whom he encounters have chosen to cheat, and the minimum possible
utility, which arises when none of the citizens whom he encounters have chosen to
cheat.
A bureaucrat’s choice is analogous to that of a citizen’s choice described earlier.
For brevity, therefore, I leave out the details. Consider a bureaucrat at the beginning
of period T , who began his active life in period t, and whose characteristics are
denoted by vector A. Let Q(S(t, T ),M,A) denote the mean of the level of cheating
in the economy, as estimated by this bureaucrat if he has found S(t, T ) citizens to
be cheating among those whom he has encountered during the past T − t periods.
Then, this bureaucrat’s choice in period T will be:
Be corrupt if and only if: Q(S(t, T ),M,A) ≥ U, (2)
where the parameter U ≡ (U1 − U01)/MU00 represents the “relative cost of corrup-
tion,” because it is increasing in U1 and decreasing in U01 and U00. Also, it follows
from the assumptions concerning the payoﬀs that 1 > U > 0.
Some properties of individuals’ choices. It should be apparent from the
above subsection that individuals’ beliefs will in general be heterogeneous at the be-
ginning of every period of their active lives, except at the beginning of their respective
initial periods, because each individual’s observations come from a diﬀerent random
draw. This subsection shows how this heterogeneity of beliefs translates into hetero-
geneity of choices. For specificity, I consider Bayesian updating of individuals’ beliefs,
and assume that their initial beliefs are represented by a non-degenerate beta distri-
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bution.6 Let a1 > 0 and a2 > 0, which are the first two elements of vector a, denote
the parameters of the beta distribution for a citizen. Let A1 > 0 and A2 > 0, which
are the first two elements of the vector A, represent the corresponding parameters
for a bureaucrat. Then,
q(s(t, T ), a) = {a1 + s(t, T )}/{a1 + a2 + (T − t)}, and (3)
Q(S(t, T ),M,A) = {A1 + S(t, T )}/{A1 +A2 + (T − t)M}; (4)
see DeGroot (1970, pp. 40 and 160).
Now, consider a bureaucrat who was corrupt in the last period. Then, the decision
rule (2) can be shown to imply that this bureaucrat will also be corrupt in the current
period if MU or more citizens cheated among the M citizens whom he encountered
in the last period. Likewise, a bureaucrat who was not corrupt in the last period
will not be corrupt in the current period if MU or fewer citizens cheated among the
M citizens whom he encountered in the last period. The reason is intuitive. If an
individual’s decision-relevant beliefs are suﬃciently reinforced by his experience in
a particular period, then he will not alter his behavior in the next period. These
conclusions, and analogous ones for a citizen, are summarized below and proven in
the Appendix.
PROPOSITION 1. (a) A citizen who cheated (did not cheat) in the last period will
not alter his behavior in the current period if he encountered a corrupt (non-corrupt)
bureaucrat in the last period. (b) A bureaucrat who was corrupt (non-corrupt) in
the last period will not alter his behavior in the current period if a suﬃciently large
(small) proportion of the citizens whom he encountered in the last period cheated.
Eﬀects of an individual’s initial beliefs on his behavior. One would expect
initial beliefs to play a more significant role in an individual’s choices in the earlier
phase of his active life. At the same time, one would expect an individual’s initial
beliefs to continue to exert some eﬀect on his choices throughout his active life. This
is indeed the case, as will be seen later when we consider diversity in initial beliefs.
6These assumptions are not necessary for the analysis, presented later, of the economy-wide
evolution of cheating and corruption. Instead, any mild form of learning-from-experience is suﬃcient;
for example, that a citizen who has encountered a larger number of corrupt bureaucrats in the past
believes that the probability of encountering a corrupt bureaucrat in the current period is larger.
Also, the assumption of a beta distribution is not particularly restrictive because other types of initial
beliefs can be approximated to a reasonable degree by this distribution with appropriately chosen
parameters.
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III. EVOLUTION OF CHEATING AND CORRUPTION
As described earlier, the number of corrupt bureaucrats that a citizen has encoun-
tered in the past is random. The same is true for the number of cheating citizens that
a bureaucrat has encountered in the past. Thus, recalling (1), the probability that a
citizen who started his active life in period t will cheat in period T can be expressed
as
f(t, T, u, a) ≡ prob{q(s(t, T ), a) ≥ u}. (5)
From (2), the corresponding probability for a bureaucrat to be corrupt is
F (t, T, U,M, a) ≡ prob{Q(S(t, T ),M,A) ≥ U}. (6)
I assume for now that citizens have identical characteristics, including their initial
beliefs, and that the same holds for the bureaucrats; diversity in individuals’ charac-
teristics is considered later. The level of cheating in period T for the cohort of citizens
which began its active life in period t is the proportion of citizens in this cohort who
cheat. This proportion is random in general. However, given the large number of
individuals, I use the Central Limit Theorem and approximate it as non-random.
This proportion is thus given by f , defined in (5).7 Likewise, the corresponding level
of corruption is F , defined in (6), and it is also non-random. It is assumed through-
out the paper that the level of cheating in each cohort of citizens, and the level of
corruption in each cohort of bureaucrats, is greater than zero and smaller than one.
Some of the reasons underlying this assumption are presented later in Section V.
Let c(T ) and C(T ) respectively denote the economy-wide levels of cheating and
corruption in the current period T . Then, from the aggregation of (5) and (6) over
all of the cohorts that are currently active:
c(T ) =
1
L
TX
t=T−L+1
f(t, T, u, a), and (7)
C(T ) =
1
L
TX
t=T−L+1
F (t, T, U,M,A). (8)
7A derivation is as follows. Let j = 1 to J denote the citizens in a cohort. Let the Bernoulli
variable Xj take the value of 1 if the j-th citizen cheats and of 0 otherwise. From (5), the probability
that the citizen will cheat is f . Hence, the variance of Xj is f(1−f). The variables X1, X2, ..., XJ are
independent and identically distributed. Define Y ≡
S
j Xj as the number of citizens, out of J , who
cheat. The Central Limit Theorem implies that, as J → ∞, Y tends to a normal random variable
with mean fJ and variance f(1− f)J . In turn, the proportion of citizens who cheat, represented by
Y/J , tends to a normal random variable with mean f and variance f(1 − f)/J . Since J is large, I
use the approximation that Y/J equals f and is not random.
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Next, consider the eﬀects of the past on the current behavior of citizens; the
eﬀects on the current behavior of bureaucrats are analogous. Suppose that the level
of corruption was higher in any of the past L − 1 periods. This implies a larger
probability that each citizen who was active in that period will have encountered a
corrupt bureaucrat. Therefore, from (5) and (7), the current level of cheating will be
higher. Thus,
∂c(T )/∂C(τ) > 0, and ∂C(T )/∂c(τ) > 0, for τ = T − L+ 1 to T − 1. (9)
For brevity in later use, (7) and (8) can be re-expressed in reduced-form as
c(T ) = g(C(T − 1), ..., C(T − L+ 1), u, a, other parameters), and (10)
C(T ) = G(c(T − 1), ..., c(T − L+ 1), U,M,A, other parameters). (11)
These two expressions describe the dynamic evolution of the economy-wide level
of cheating and corruption. Further, given (9), the dynamic interactions between
expressions (10) and (11) yield
∂c(T )/∂c(τ) > 0, and ∂C(T )/∂C(τ) > 0 for τ = T − L+ 1 to T − 2. (12)
Expressions (9) and (12) yield
PROPOSITION 2. A higher level of cheating or corruption in the past results in
a higher level of cheating as well as a higher level of corruption in the future.
A summary of the nature of knowledge of individuals. I briefly summarize
here the nature of individuals’ knowledge depicted in the analysis presented thus far,
and how and why this knowledge is diﬀerent from the data which may exist in the
economy but, given the nature of the economic phenomenon under consideration, is
unavailable to individuals. For brevity, I discuss here only the citizens; the summary
for the bureaucrats is analogous.
In the present simplified version of the model, citizens have homogenous initial
beliefs, and they are homogenous in all of their other characteristics. Consequently,
their actions are homogenous in the initial period of their respective lives. Consider
the next period. Each citizen in a cohort collects observations which come from a
diﬀerent random draw. Their beliefs are therefore heterogeneous, as seen explicitly
in the Bayesian illustration in (3). The choice of a citizen in this period is binary; to
cheat or not cheat. Since the beliefs of citizens are heterogeneous, there choices are
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heterogeneous. These choices are described in (1) as outcomes of a binary random
variable. The same heterogeneity of beliefs and choices is present in each cohort
of citizens in all periods after the initial periods of their respective lives. This het-
erogeneity is consistent with the empirical evidence summarized in the introductory
section.
Now consider the economy-wide levels. Recall from above that the choices made
by the citizens in a cohort are represented by a binary random variable. Since the
number of citizens in a cohort is large, I use the Central Limit Theorem as an approx-
imation. Consequently, the level of cheating in this cohort (that is, the proportion
of citizens who chose to cheat in this cohort) in a period is non-random. This non-
random level of cheating is stated as (5). Aggregating across the cohorts of citizens,
the economy-wide level of cheating, represented by c(T ) in (7), is also non-random.
Analogous reasoning concerning the beliefs and choices of bureaucrats yields that the
economy-wide level of corruption, represented by C(T ) in (8), is non-random.
The above depiction of c(T ) and C(T ) as non-random is for analytical convenience
only. More important is the premise that no individual in the economy knows the
precise magnitudes of c(T ) and C(T ). This is consistent with the empirical findings
noted earlier concerning the heterogeneity in individuals’ beliefs. Further, there are
no public or market entities which do or can obtain these magnitudes and make them
available to individuals, even at a cost to the latter. This is consistent with the het-
erogeneity reflected in the surveys of experts’ beliefs about the levels of corruption.
Even the abstract feasibility of a public or market entity being able to provide to
citizens the magnitudes of c(T ) and C(T ) is doubtful. This is because, in such a
situation, the ultimate sources of information (namely, the citizens and the bureau-
crats) as well as the aggregators of information (namely, a public or private entity)
are both naturally subject to such issues as incentives, truthfulness, verifiability and
legitimacy.
Now, consider a citizen once again. Given that the value of C(T ) is not known
to him, he uses all of the information that he has, from his own experiences and
from other sources discussed earlier. The phrase “osmosis” in the title of this paper
additionally underscores this central aspect of the present analysis; in life-sciences,
the ultimate locus of osmosis is almost always local rather than global. At each
stage of his life, an individual’s choices are based on the information which he has
as of that date. Finally note that, for the case of Bayesian updating, I have shown
that an individual’s choices are fully consistent with the information which he has.
Thus, while other behavioral assumptions (for example, bounded rationality) can be
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accommodated within the present analysis, it does not necessarily require them.
IV. STEADY-STATES AND COMPARATIVE STATICS
I now analyze the steady-states of the dynamic system described by (10) and
(11). Here, a steady-state is a hypothetical situation in which the period-to-period
changes in the levels of cheating and corruption are negligible. We look at only those
steady-states that are locally stable, that is, the “sinks” of the dynamic system (see
Hirsch and Smale (1974, p. 280) for a definition). If the economy is close to such
a steady-state, and receives small shocks, from whatever sources, then the economy
will in the future return to the same steady-state. It is important to emphasize that
a steady-state is not an equilibrium, because there are no agents or forces in this
economy who can, or who wish to, bring it to an equilibrium. Instead, a steady-
state here is simply a stylized depiction, derived from dynamic analysis, that can be
potentially helpful in studying certain qualitative properties of the economy.
Let c and C respectively denote the economy-wide levels of cheating and cor-
ruption at a steady-state. For brevity, let φ denote any parameter that aﬀects the
function g in (10), such as any element of a. Likewise, let Φ denote any parameter
that aﬀects the function G in (11), such as U , M , or any element of A. Then, from
(10) and (11), a solution of the equation system
c = h(C, φ) and C = H(c,Φ) (13)
defines a steady-state value of c and C.
The equations in (13) are highly nonlinear, as will be seen later. Hence, these
equations will in general admit multiple steady-states. Therefore, recalling Proposi-
tion 2, we can state
PROPOSITION 3. Consider two economies with identical current economic fun-
damentals. These economies can have diﬀerent steady-state levels of cheating and
corruption. An economy with higher steady-state levels of cheating and corruption
will have had at least some history of higher levels of cheating or corruption or both.
The historical process described earlier allows us to understand how diﬀerent
steady-states might be reached. For instance, two economies with identical current
parameters may reach two diﬀerent steady-states if they have faced diﬀerent kinds
of shocks in the past, or if they have faced similar shocks but at diﬀerent times in
the past. No matter what the reason, once the levels of cheating and corruption in
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these two economies begin to diverge significantly, there may not be forces in these
economies that will eliminate or even reduce these diﬀerences.
Explicit expressions for the steady-states. For later use, I now present an
explicit version of (13) based on Bayesian updating. Let c ≡ T − t represent the
number of periods for which a citizen has been active. Recalling (1), define r¯(c, u, a)
through the equality q(r¯(c, u, a), a) = u. From (1) and (3), it follows that
r¯(c, u, a) ≡ (a1 + a2 + c)u− a1. (14)
Next define r(c, u, a) as the smallest integer that is greater than or equal to r¯(c, u, a).
That is,
r(c, u, a) ≡ [r¯(c, u, a)]+, (15)
where [ ]+ is the rounding-oﬀ function just described. It then follows from (1) and
(3) that a citizen who has lived for c periods will choose to cheat in the (c + 1)st
period of his active life if and only if he has encountered r(c, u, a) or more corrupt
bureaucrats in the past. Hence, we refer to r(c, u, a) as the “reservation level” of a
citizen.
Let b(j, c, C) ≡
³
c
j
´
(C)j(1−C)c−j denote the binomial probability of j successes
out of c trials where the probability of success in each trial is C. Let B(r, c, C) ≡Pr
j=0 b(j, c, C) denote the cumulative binomial distribution. Now consider the cohort
that has been active for c periods. It follows that this cohort’s level of cheating in
the (c+ 1)st period of its life, denoted by cc+1 (where c+ 1 is a superscript), will be
cc+1 ≡ 1−B(r(c, u, a)− 1, c, C). (16)
Further, the economy-wide level of cheating will be
c = h(C, φ) ≡ 1
L
L−1X
c=0
cc+1. (17)
Since the description of the bureaucrats’ behavior is analogous, I leave out the
details, and state the corresponding expressions:
R¯(c, U,M,A) ≡ (A1 +A2 + cM)U −A1, (18)
R(c, U,M,A) ≡ [R¯(c, U,M,A)]+, (19)
Cc+1 ≡ 1−B(R(c, U,M,A)− 1, cM, c), and (20)
C = H(c,Φ) ≡ 1
L
L−1X
c=0
Cc+1. (21)
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Equations (17) and (21) provide an explicit version of (13). These highly nonlinear
equations will, in general, admit multiple solutions. Numerical solutions confirm this
and also show that, for the same set of parameter values, the diﬀerences among the
solutions are often large.
Comparative statics of the steady-states. Let a letter subscript denote the
parameter with respect to which a partial derivative is being taken; for example,
hφ ≡ ∂h(C, φ)/∂φ. I use (9) and perturb the system (13) around a steady-state. I
use some results presented in Sah (1999) which, in turn, employ a theorem in Sah
(1991b). This yields
sgn{dc/dφ} = sgn{dC/dφ} = sgn{hφ}, (22)
sgn{dC/dΦ} = sgn{dc/dΦ} = sgn{HΦ}, (23)
|dc/dφ| > |hφ|, and |dC/dΦ| > |HΦ|. (24)
To interpret these expressions, note that hφ can be viewed as the first-round
eﬀect of a change in a parameter on the level of cheating. The levels of cheating and
corruption in future periods are aﬀected not only by the preceding parameter change
but also by a sequence of indirect dynamic eﬀects. Accordingly, dc/dφ and dC/dφ
respectively represent the full eﬀects of a sustained change in parameter φ on the
steady-state levels of cheating and corruption. Analogous interpretations apply to
HΦ and its impacts, dc/dΦ and dC/dΦ, on the steady-state.
PROPOSITION 4. Consider a sustained change in a parameter that aﬀects either
the level of cheating or the level of corruption. (a) The eﬀect of this change on the
steady-state levels of cheating as well as corruption has the same sign as that of the
first-round eﬀect of the parameter change. (b) The magnitude of change in the steady-
state level of cheating (corruption) is larger than that of the first-round eﬀect of a
parameter change that aﬀects the level of cheating (corruption).
Some eﬀects of changes in the costs of cheating and corruption. To see
an illustration of the above proposition, consider a sustained increase in the relative
cost of corruption, U . The first-round impact of an increase in U is to lower the level
of corruption, because being corrupt is now less attractive to some bureaucrats than
not being corrupt.8 Because of this, citizens will in future periods encounter fewer
corrupt bureaucrats leading to a reduced level of cheating. In turn, bureaucrats will
8This can be seen as follows; for brevity, I leave aside some minor details. Note from (18) and
(19) that R is non-decreasing in U . Assume that the increase in U induces an increase in R for at
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in future periods encounter fewer cheating citizens. Thus, the indirect eﬀects will
reinforce the direct eﬀect. Consequently, the steady-state level of cheating as well as
corruption will be lower. Further, the decrease in the steady-state level of corruption
will be larger in magnitude than the first-round reduction in the level of corruption.
Using identical reasoning, it can be seen that a sustained increase in the relative cost
of cheating will lead to lower steady-state levels of cheating as well as corruption, and
that the steady-state level of cheating will decline by a larger magnitude than that
of the first-round eﬀect of this parameter change.
Some eﬀects of the sources of information that influence individuals’
beliefs. To simplify the analysis, I have thus far used the abstraction that, in each pe-
riod: (i) a citizen encounters one bureaucrat; (ii) a bureaucrat encountersM citizens;
and (iii) these are the only sources of information which influence individuals’ beliefs.
I also assumed a particular format of interactions between citizens and bureaucrats,
including that each pair of participants in the interaction is chosen randomly in each
period. Such assumptions were made for brevity. The main point here is that an
individual learns, at times erroneously, from a variety of sources. For instance, an
individual’s friends and relatives might be additional sources of information, but such
sources may contain errors, perhaps prompting an individual to place more weight
on one’s own observations than on those of the others. Rumors and hearsay are an-
other error-laden source of information. Likewise, the mass media may not contain
information that is highly meaningful for decision-making because of its usual focus
on a few high-profile cases. From an economic viewpoint, a given number of addi-
tional observations containing errors is nearly the same as fewer additional error-free
observations.
To examine the eﬀects of additional observations, consider an increase in the
number of citizens that a bureaucrat encounters in each period. Suppose that this
number is M + 1 instead of M . Then, a bureaucrat’s: (i) sample size increases
because he has obtained one more observation in each of the past periods in which
he was active, and (ii) reservation level will likely increase because he now requires
greater evidence of cheating (that is, a larger number of past encounters with cheating
citizens) to be convinced that it is in his interest to be corrupt.
It is intuitive to expect that if the current level of cheating is high, then a larger
M will increase the probability of a bureaucrat being corrupt. This is because a larger
M will make it more likely that the increased reservation level is satisfied. In this
least one of the relevant values of c. From (20), Cc+1 is decreasing in R because B is increasing in
R. Hence, from (21), H is decreasing in U .
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case, the level of cheating and corruption in the economy will likely increase. On the
other hand, a low level of cheating is likely to have the opposite eﬀect. This intuition
is supported by the result stated below which is derived in the Appendix. A similar
result holds for an increase in the number of bureaucrats that a citizen encounters in
each period.
PROPOSITION 5. Suppose that the youngest cohorts of bureaucrats are indiﬀerent
between being corrupt and not corrupt. Then, increased interactions between citizens
and bureaucrats result in increased (decreased) level of cheating as well as an increased
(decreased) level of corruption in the economy if the current level of cheating is larger
(smaller) than the relative cost of corruption.
V. DIVERSITY OF INITIAL BELIEFS
It is natural to posit that individuals begin their active lives with diverse initial
beliefs, even though, for simplicity, I have thus far assumed otherwise. The incorpo-
ration of this diversity requires a small modification in the preceding analysis and it
yields several insights. Let w1(a1) and w2(a2) denote the distribution functions of a1
and a2, and let W1(A1) and W2(A2) denote the distribution functions of A1 and A2.
Then, instead of (17) and (21), the expressions for the steady-states are
c = h(C,φ) ≡ 1
L
L−1X
c=0
cc+1 (25)
=
1
L
L−1X
c=0
Z
a1
Z
a2
{1−B(r(c, u, a)− 1, c, C)}dw1(a1)dw2(a2), and
C = H(c,Φ) ≡ 1
L
L−1X
c=0
Cc+1 (26)
=
1
L
L−1X
c=0
Z
A1
Z
A2
{1−B(R(c, U,M,A)− 1, cM, c)}dW1(A1)dW2(A2).
Now recall an earlier assertion that the initial beliefs of an individual exert some
influence on his choices throughout his life. A simple way to illustrate this is to
compare the behavior of a bureaucrat who, given his initial beliefs, was initially not
corrupt to that of a bureaucrat who was initially corrupt. The following result is
derived in the Appendix. An analogous result holds for citizens.
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PROPOSITION 6. An initially corrupt bureaucrat cannot have a smaller probabil-
ity of being corrupt in any subsequent period than a bureaucrat who was not initially
corrupt.
Extremes of cheating and corruption. Is is possible that all bureaucrats in
an economy are corrupt, or that no bureaucrat is corrupt? Likewise, is it possible
that all citizens in an economy cheat, or that no citizen cheats? The analysis below
shows that, under plausible assumptions, the answer is no.
Consider the possibility of a steady-state in which no bureaucrat is corrupt; that
is, of the “corner” steady-state in which C = 0. Such a steady-state obviously requires
the youngest cohorts of bureaucrats to be non-corrupt. However, this steady-state
is not sustained if even a few members of the youngest cohorts of citizens choose to
cheat. The arrival of these few citizens into the economy in each period will eventually
cause at least some bureaucrats, among those who happen to encounter one or more
of these cheating citizens, to believe that it is in their interest to be corrupt. The
choice of these bureaucrats to be corrupt will, in turn, cause more citizens to cheat
in the future. The resulting steady-state must therefore entail at least some cheating
and some corruption.
Analogous reasoning suggests the infeasibility of other corner steady-states, in
which all bureaucrats are corrupt, and in which all or none of the citizens choose
to cheat. These conclusions, proven in the Appendix, are summarized below. As
shown in the Appendix, a suﬃcient condition for these results is that the number of
periods for which the individuals are active in the economy is not too small, so that
the dynamics initiated by a small subset of individuals do not die out before they
have had an opportunity to aﬀect the economy.
PROPOSITION 7.
(a) At least some bureaucrats will be corrupt, even if all bureaucrats begin their
lives not being corrupt, provided that at least a few citizens begin their lives choosing
to cheat.
(b) At least some bureaucrats will not be corrupt, even if all bureaucrats begin their
lives being corrupt, provided that at least a few citizens begin their lives choosing not
to cheat.
(c) At least some citizens will cheat, even if all citizens begin their lives choosing
not to cheat, provided that at least a few bureaucrats begin their lives choosing to be
corrupt.
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(d) At least some citizens will choose not to cheat, even if all citizens begin their
lives choosing to cheat, provided that at least a few bureaucrats begin their lives choos-
ing not to be corrupt.
Some eﬀects of the nature of initial beliefs. The initial beliefs of a bureau-
crat are represented by the parameters (A1, A2). Substituting t = T and S(t, T ) = 0
into (4), it is easily ascertained that a bureaucrat with a larger A1 or a smaller A2
begins his active life with a larger estimate of the mean level of cheating in the econ-
omy. Consider a first-order stochastic improvement in the distribution of A1, or a
first-order stochastic worsening in the distribution of A2. Each of these two pertur-
bations imply that a larger fraction of the youngest cohorts of bureaucrats believes
that there is a greater prevalence of cheating in the economy. Likewise, a first-order
stochastic improvement in the distribution of a1, or a first-order stochastic worsening
in the distribution of a2, implies that a larger fraction of the youngest cohorts of
citizens believe that there is a greater prevalence of corruption in the economy.
All of the four perturbations just mentioned have similar implications. A first-
order stochastic improvement in the distribution of A1 will lead to at least a few
more bureaucrats choosing to be corrupt. This, in turn, will initiate a dynamics
inducing more citizens to cheat and more bureaucrats to be corrupt. Thus, the new
steady-state to which the economy will settle will have higher levels of cheating and
corruption. The eﬀects of the other three perturbations can be traced similarly. These
conclusions are summarized below, and are derived in the Appendix.
PROPOSITION 8. If a larger fraction of the youngest cohorts of bureaucrats be-
lieve that the level of cheating is higher in the economy, or if a larger fraction of the
youngest cohorts of citizens believe that the level of corruption is higher in the econ-
omy, then the actual level of cheating as well as that of corruption in the economy
will be higher.
VI. SOME EXTENSIONS
This section presents some extensions of the analysis presented earlier. Each
extension is considered separately from the others.
Heterogeneity in individuals’ characteristics. The only source of hetero-
geneity in individuals’ characteristics in the preceding analysis is that due to their
initial beliefs. To see how other kinds of heterogeneity can be incorporated, con-
sider the case in which the benefits to a citizen from alternative actions (that is,
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from cheating or not cheating) depend partly on his wealth. One can then charac-
terize the steady-states of the economy for any given distribution of wealth in the
economy. Moreover, one can establish intuitive results of the following kind: If a
citizen’s relative cost of cheating is decreasing in his wealth, then a first-order sto-
chastic improvement in the distribution of wealth will result in higher steady-state
levels of cheating as well as corruption. The eﬀects of other types of heterogeneity
(such as those in individuals’ preferences for cheating or corruption) can be examined
similarly.
A bureaucrat’s trade-oﬀs. In the earlier analysis, a bureaucrat’s trade-oﬀ
was as follows. The gain to a bureaucrat from being corrupt was U0(m), which was
linearly increasing in m, where m denoted the number of cheating citizens that the
bureaucrat encounters in a period. Now suppose that U0 is increasing in m but not
in a linear fashion. Then, the decision rule (2) will get redefined, but it will still be
the case that a bureaucrat is more likely to be corrupt if he has encountered a larger
number of cheating citizens in the past.
Individuals’ payoﬀs. A possible extension is to incorporate the eﬀects of the
levels of cheating and corruption on individuals’ payoﬀs. For example, a higher level of
corruption may reduce the benefits from corruption, because of increased dissipation
of the surplus from corruption. The opposite eﬀect may arise if a higher level of
corruption leads to increasingly larger parts (for example, sectors and regions) of the
economy becoming subject to corruption. I do not study here the nature of these
eﬀects and their consequences, which will depend partly on the context of corruption.
VII. SOME SPECULATIVE REMARKS
In the last two thousand years of recorded history, pervasive and persistent cor-
ruption has been the norm in human societies rather than the exception. It is unlikely
that “good old days” ever existed except locally and temporarily. Perhaps the most
notable large-scale exception is the decline, in relation to its previous very long-term
past, in corruption in northwestern Europe, beginning roughly in the mid 19th cen-
tury, and the sustained low levels thereafter. In a historical sense, as well as in
comparison to the rest of the contemporaneous world, this change was monumental.
The present understanding of the fundamental causes and processes of these changes
is quite limited; see Glaeser and Goldin (2004) for their pioneering work on the United
States and for a summary of the insights from related work.
There are several informal hypotheses concerning corruption which are potentially
important but whose causal structures have not been adequately articulated. Among
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these are the possible roles of religion and democracy. An example of the hypothesis
concerning religion is that Protestantism, as in Scandinavia, encouraged and contin-
ues to encourage lower corruption in contrast with Catholicism, as in Spain. Among
the examples which suggests that religious diﬀerences may not be central are those
mentioned earlier for regions within Italy and India. One argument concerning the
role of democracy is that citizens’ participation reduces corruption. However, there
are several counter-examples. For instance, among postcolonial societies, corruption
was nearly eliminated in Singapore by the authoritarian government of Lee Kuan
Yew, whereas it is pervasive in the democracy of India. The analysis presented in
this paper accommodates heterogeneity of individuals’ preference, and this can partly
capture the role of factors such as religion. Likewise, this analysis accommodates a
variety of parameters which might be diﬀerent in democracies versus autocracies, in-
cluding those describing detection and punishment of those who cheat or are corrupt.
A causal analysis of the hypotheses noted in this paragraph will require, at the mini-
mum, specifications of how particular religions and forms of governance are reflected
in the parameters describing individuals’ perceptions, preferences and opportunities.
Another hypothesis, of which the causal structure is unclear, is that the level of
corruption declines when a society reaches some high level of income and wealth. The
reverse possibility is that lower levels of corruption induce higher level of incomes. If
this hypothesis is predicated upon the notion that the poor have a higher willingness
to live with corruption, then it is unclear whether this is because of their preferences
or because they have more limited alternatives. These two perspectives will likely
have quite diﬀerent implications, especially for the welfare costs of corruption.
Yet another hypothesis is that a smaller role of government results in lower lev-
els of corruption. A key idea here, which has obvious strength, is that a smaller
role of government means fewer opportunities for corruption, which results in less
overall corruption. It is unlikely however that this hypothesis, by itself, can explain
experiences such as those noted at the beginning of this section concerning north-
western Europe. During the period under consideration (namely, beginning roughly
in mid 19th century), the role and the size of government has increased in these
countries almost continuously until the late 20th century. These and other puzzles
await answers.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider a bureaucrat who was corrupt in period
T . From (2) and (4), thus, A1 + S(t, T ) ≥ [A1 + A2 + (T − t)M ]U . Suppose that
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MU or more citizens out of M whom he encountered in period T had cheated.
That is, S(t, T + 1) ≥ S(t, T ) + MU . The preceding two inequalities imply that
A1 + S(t, T + 1) ≥ [A1 + A2 + (T − t + 1)M ]U . From (2) and (4), therefore, this
bureaucrat will be corrupt in period T + 1. Analogous proofs apply to the behavior
of: (a) a bureaucrat who was not corrupt in the previous period; (b) a citizen who
cheated in the previous period; and (c) a citizen who did not cheat in the previous
period.
Proof of Proposition 5. We: (i) treat M as a continuous variable; (ii) ig-
nore the distinction between R and R¯, described respectively in (18) and (19); and
(iii) approximate the binomial distribution function in the right-hand side of (20) by
a normal distribution function. Then, from (20),
Cc+1 = 1−N [(R¯− cMc){cMc(1− c)}−1/2], (A1)
where N [ ] represents the distribution function of the unit normal variate, and R¯ is
given by (18). The derivative of the right-hand side of (A1), with respect to M , can
be rearranged to yield
sgn{dCc+1/dM} = sgn{cM(c− U) +A∗}, (A2)
where A∗ ≡ (A1+A2)U−A1. Next, note from (2) and (4) that the youngest cohorts of
bureaucrats (for whom t = T and S(t, T ) = 0) are indiﬀerent between being corrupt
and non-corrupt if A∗ = 0. Hence, the desired result follows from (A2).
Proof of Proposition 6. Let the parameters Aj1 and A
j
2 denote the initial
beliefs of two bureaucrats represented by the superscript j = 1, 2. Now suppose that
bureaucrat 1 was initially corrupt and bureaucrat 2 was not. Then, the substitution
of c = 0 into (18) yields: [(A21+A
2
2)U−A21] > 0 ≥ [(A11+A12)U−A11]. Adding cMU to
all terms in the preceding expression and using (18), we obtain R¯(c, U,M,A21, A
2
2) >
R¯(c, U,M,A11, A
1
2). In turn, from (19),
R(c, U,M,A21, A
2
2) ≥ R(c, U,M,A11, A12), for all c. (A3)
The probability that the bureaucrat j will be corrupt in a subsequent period of his
life (that is, for c = 1 to L − 1) is 1 − B(R(c, U,M,Aj1, A
j
2) − 1, cM, c). Since B is
increasing in R, the desired result follows from (A3).
Proof of Proposition 7. The following properties of the binomial cumulative
distribution, B(r, c, C), are used below. If 0 < C < 1, then: (i) B = 0 if r < 0; and
(ii) B = 1 if r ≥ c. If C = 0, then: (i) B = 0 if r < 0; and (ii) B = 1 if r ≥ 0. If
C = 1, then: (i) B = 0 if r < c; and (ii) B = 1 if r ≥ c.
25
We prove here part (a) of Proposition 7; the proofs of the other parts are analo-
gous. Since c1 > 0, it follows from (25) that
c > 0. (A4)
Recalling (26), and noting that C1 = 0, the condition for C = 0 is that
1−B(R(c, U,M,A)− 1, cM, c) = 0 (A5)
for each c ≥ 1, and for each value of (A1, A2). Now, recall the properties of the
binomial distribution function noted earlier. Given (A4), the condition (A5) can be
satisfied only if
R(c, U,M,A)− 1 ≥ cM. (A6)
We ignore the distinction between R¯ and R, described in (18) and (19). Using (18),
the condition (A6) can be restated as
(A1 +A2)U − (A1 + 1) ≥ cM(1− U).
Since U < 1, the preceding condition cannot be satisfied (and, hence, C cannot be
zero) if c is suﬃciently large.
Proof of Proposition 8. Assuming that the end-points of A1 are fixed, let the
distribution function of A1 be denoted by W1(A1,Φ), such that a larger value of the
parameter Φ represents a first-order stochastic improvement in the distribution of
A. That is, ∂W1/∂Φ ≤ 0 and the inequality is strict for at least some values of A1.
Recalling (18) and (19), and ignoring the distinction between R¯ and R, it follows
from (18) that
∂R/∂A1 < 0. (A7)
Next, consider (26), and, for brevity, define Z ≡ 1 − B(R(c, U,M,A) − 1, cM, c).
Hence, ∂Z/∂R ≤ 0. Combining this with (A7), we get ∂Z/∂A1 ≥ 0. To avoid
unnecessary details, we assume that there is at least one set of values of c and A1
for which the preceding inequality is strict and dW1/dΦ is strictly negative. From
(26) and a standard result on first-order stochastic dominance, then, HΦ > 0. In
turn, from (23), dc/dΦ > 0 and dC/dΦ > 0. Analogous reasoning yields the results
concerning the stochastic changes in the distributions of A2, a1, and a2.
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